Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_8MaRDI QIDQ5486928zbMATHFDO

Authors Daniel Diermeier, Rebecca B. Morton

Publication date 18 September 2006

Published in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(17)

• Legislative bargaining with teams
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• Universalism and the value of political power
• Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
• Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
• Buying supermajorities in the lab
• Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
• Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
• Veto power in committees: An experimental study
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences
• Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games
• The dynamics of distributive politics
• Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
• Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

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