Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.12.002MaRDI QIDQ980953zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michalis Drouvelis, Maria Montero, M. Sefton

Publication date 8 July 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsnon-cooperative bargainingpower indicesvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A Structural Model of Government Formation
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Bargaining and Value
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining
• Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
• Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3653824 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
• Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel.
• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Veto power in committees: An experimental study

Cited in

(13)

• Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not?
• Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
• Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
• Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining
• Too big to prevail: the paradox of power in coalition formation
• Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
• A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment
• Veto power in committees: An experimental study
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence

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