Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
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Publication:980953
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.002zbMath1230.91024OpenAlexW2052346689MaRDI QIDQ980953
Martin Sefton, Michalis Drouvelis, Maria Montero
Publication date: 8 July 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.002
Related Items (13)
Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining ⋮ Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not? ⋮ Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining ⋮ Too big to prevail: the paradox of power in coalition formation ⋮ Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments ⋮ Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment ⋮ Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining ⋮ A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Veto power in committees: An experimental study ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence ⋮ Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis ⋮ Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
Uses Software
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