Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU
From MaRDI portal
Publication:866934
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6zbMath1134.91355MaRDI QIDQ866934
Francesco Passarelli, Jason Barr
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6
91B06: Decision theory
91B12: Voting theory
91F10: History, political science
91B82: Statistical methods; economic indices and measures
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