Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0155-6MaRDI QIDQ866934zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesco Passarelli, Jason Barr

Publication date 14 February 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3396952 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multilinear Extensions of Games
• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting

Cited in

(18)

• Who has the power in the EU?
• The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
• An issue based power index
• Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union
• Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices
• Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit
• Power indices taking into account the agents' preferences to coalesce
• An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index
• Probabilistic spatial power indexes
• Power sharing in politics
• Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation
• The power of a spatially inferior player
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5589328 (Why is no real title available?)
• Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure
• Spatial power indices with a finite number of issues
• The distribution of power in the European constitution
• The complexity of power indexes with graph restricted coalitions
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence

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