Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6zbMath1134.91355MaRDI QIDQ866934

Francesco Passarelli, Jason Barr

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B12: Voting theory

91F10: History, political science

91B82: Statistical methods; economic indices and measures

Related Items

Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure, The complexity of power indexes with graph restricted coalitions, Who has the power in the EU?, The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization, Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union, Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices, Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit, An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index, Probabilistic spatial power indexes

Cites Work

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• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
• Multilinear Extensions of Games