Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0502-5zbMath1235.91058OpenAlexW2144955260MaRDI QIDQ649129

Mika Widgrén, Stefan Napel

Publication date: 30 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0502-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (3)

Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics ⋮ Probabilistic spatial power indexes ⋮ Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
• Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Multilinear Extensions of Games

This page was built for publication: Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure