Multilinear Extensions of Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5650223
DOI10.1287/mnsc.18.5.64zbMath0239.90049OpenAlexW3145361113WikidataQ56157247 ScholiaQ56157247MaRDI QIDQ5650223
Publication date: 1972
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.18.5.64
Related Items
Modeling interaction phenomena using fuzzy measures: On the notions of interaction and independence, Fuzzy bi-cooperative games in multilinear extension form, Semifuzzy games, The not-quite non-atomic game: Normal approximation, The measure of interaction among players in games with fuzzy coalitions, Indirect control of corporations, The unwalked path between quasi-copulas and copulas: stepping stones in higher dimensions, Knapsack problems with dependencies through non-additive measures and Choquet integral, On weighted Shapley values, Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration, A lexicographical solution concept in an \(n\)-person cooperative fuzzy game, Even and odd marginal worth vectors, Owen's multilinear extension and convex games, Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices, The impact of intermediaries on a negotiation: an approach from game theory, Axiomatic characterizations of generalized values, Game theoretic interaction and decision: a quantum analysis, The multilinear extension and the modified Banzhaf-Coleman index, The multilinear extension of the quotient game, Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU, Potential, value, and the multilinear extension, Nonadditive integration and some solutions of cooperative games, Cores and Weber sets for fuzzy extensions of cooperative games, The fuzzy core and Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization, Subsignatures of systems, A method to calculate generalized mixed modified semivalues: application to the Catalan Parliament (legislature 2012--2016), Pivotal decompositions of functions., The interval Shapley value: an axiomatization, The arity gap of order-preserving functions and extensions of pseudo-Boolean functions, Two-step coalition values for multichoice games, Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value, A note on the Sobol' indices and interactive criteria, Nullified equal loss property and equal division values, Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes., Extension operators for TU games and the Lovász extension, Rationalization of detection of the multiple disorders, A system-theoretic model for cooperation, interaction and allocation, A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently, Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions, Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure, Estimation of the weights of interacting criteria from the set of profiles by means of information-theoretic functionals., A novel intensive distribution logistics network design and profit allocation problem considering sharing economy, Computing subsignatures of systems with exchangeable component lifetimes, Influence and interaction indexes for pseudo-Boolean functions: a unified least squares approach, On importance indices in multicriteria decision making, Pyramidal values, A general procedure to compute mixed modified semivalues for cooperative games with structure of coalition blocks, Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games, Capital allocation for portfolios with non-linear risk aggregation, Sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf-Owen value, Probabilistic network values, The multilinear extension and the coalition structure value, Weighted values and the core, Easy and optimal queries to reduce set uncertainty, A note on multinomial probabilistic values, The link between the Shapley value and the beta factor, Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems, Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling, A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value, On modular decompositions of system signatures, On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members, Maximization of the Choquet integral over a convex set and its application to resource allocation problems, The Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games with multilinear extension form, Prices in mixed cost allocation problems, Weighted Banzhaf power and interaction indexes through weighted approximations of games, Dynamic programming algorithms for computing power indices in weighted multi-tier games, Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games, Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions, Interaction indices for games on combinatorial structures with forbidden coalitions, Calculating direct and indirect contributions of players in cooperative games via the multi-linear extension, Solidarity value and solidarity share functions for TU fuzzy games, Robust stochastic sorting with interacting criteria hierarchically structured, Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold, Core and superdifferential of a fuzzy \(TU \)-cooperative game, Applications of game theory to threshold logic, The multilinear model in multicriteria decision making: the case of 2-additive capacities and contributions to parameter identification, Linear fuzzy game with coalition interaction and its coincident solutions, The general prenucleolus of \(n\)-person cooperative fuzzy games, An approach via generating functions to compute power indices of multiple weighted voting games with incompatible players, An analog of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem. I: The non-emptiness of the core of a fuzzy game, Fuzzy Harsanyi solution for a kind of fuzzy coalition games, Partnership formation and binomial semivalues, The space of conditional systems is a ball, The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent, The fuzzy core in games with fuzzy coalitions, Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations, Potentials in cooperative TU-games, On the core and Shapley value for regular polynomial games, Tensor approximation of cooperative games and their semivalues, A note on the decomposability of inequality measures, Generalized form solutions of cooperative game with fuzzy coalition structure, Values of games with probabilistic graphs, The influence of variables on pseudo-Boolean functions with applications to game theory and multicriteria decision making, Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index, Measuring power in coalitional games with friends, enemies and allies, Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues, Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation, Power indices in a discretely proportional representative system with a large number of voters, Computation of several power indices by generating functions, The equalizer and the lexicographical solutions for cooperative fuzzy games: Characterization and properties, ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE, WEBER POLYHEDRON AND WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES, A simplified expression of the Shapley function for fuzzy game, A NOTE ON CHARACTERIZING CORE STABILITY WITH FUZZY GAMES, Structural properties of continuum systems, A linear approximation method for the Shapley value, The prediction value, Scarcity, competition, and value, Approximations of pseudo-Boolean functions; applications to game theory, The dual Lovász extension operator and the Shapley extension operator for TU games, The Apportionment of Representation and The Voting Power, Statistics and game theory: estimating coalitional values in R software, The inverse Shapley value problem, Too big to prevail: the paradox of power in coalition formation, On stratified sampling for estimating coalitional values, Aggregation with dependencies: capacities and fuzzy integrals, The potential and consistency of the Owen value for fuzzy cooperative games with a coalition structure, Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters, Choquet-Sugeno-like operator based on relation and conditional aggregation operators, IMPORTANCE IN SYSTEMS WITH INTERVAL DECISIONS, New characterizations and a concept of potential for each multinomial (probabilistic) value, Unnamed Item, Values of Graph-Restricted Games, Partnership formation and multinomial values, Reliability of Systems with Dependent Components Based on Lattice Polynomial Description, Explaining Hierarchical Multi-linear Models, ASPECTS OF EXCHANGEABILITY IN THE SHAPLEY VALUE, Shapley mappings and the cumulative value for \(n\)-person games with fuzzy coalitions, Vector Space of Cooperative Games: Construction of Basis Related with Solutions Based on Marginal Contributions and Determination of Games with Predefined Allocations, Games on lattices, multichoice games and the Shapley value: a new approach, A Review of Some Recent Results on Power Indices, Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters, Fair Voting Rules in Committees, Limit Property of a Multi-Choice Value and the Fuzzy Value, A Game‐Theoretic Approach to Partitioning Attributable Risks in Epidemiology, Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new characterizations, A NOTE ON REGULAR SEMIVALUES, Unnamed Item, Computing Shapley Effects for Sensitivity Analysis, Weighted lattice polynomials of independent random variables, On the interval Shapley value, A value for multichoice games, An axiomatic approach to the measurement of the amount of interaction among criteria or players, \(\alpha\)-decisiveness in simple games, Monotonicity of power and power measures, Takeover prices and portfolio theory, The Lovász extension of market games, Bisemivalues for bicooperative games, Cumulative distribution functions and moments of lattice polynomials, Weighted Shapley values for games in generalized characteristic function form, An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index, The multilinear extension and the symmetric coalition Banzhaf value, Characterizations ofk-Convex Games, An axiomatic characterization for regular semivalues, Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices, Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games, Cooperative Fuzzy Games with Convex Combination Form, Comments on: ``Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities, Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games, Separability by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure, Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value, Characterizations of power indices based on null player free winning coalitions, Unnamed Item, A Shapley--Owen Index for Interaction Quantification, Cooperative Game as Non-Additive Measure, APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY TO ECONOMICS, POWER INDICES AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES, CHOQUET EXTENSION OF COOPERATIVE GAMES, SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES, The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives, Random projectors with continuous resolutions of the identity in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space
