The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1680731
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.05.003zbMath1415.91045OpenAlexW2621025975MaRDI QIDQ1680731
Mathieu Martin, Bertrand Tchantcho, Zéphirin Nganmeni
Publication date: 16 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.05.003
Cooperative games (91A12) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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