Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity
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Publication:2178649
DOI10.1007/S00182-019-00692-2zbMATH Open1437.91032OpenAlexW2908617624MaRDI QIDQ2178649FDOQ2178649
Authors: Ori Haimanko 
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/1813.pdf
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simple gamesShapley-Shubik indexvoting powerBanzhaf indexsemivaluesColeman-Shapley indexpower of collectivity to actprobabilistic mixturestotal-power monotonicity axiom
Cites Work
- Bargaining and Value
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
- Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
- Semivalues of Simple Games
- Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value
- The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index
Cited In (5)
- A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index
- Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
- On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
- The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
- Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index
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