An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value

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Publication:1106746

DOI10.1007/BF01254541zbMath0651.90097OpenAlexW2148579014WikidataQ29039122 ScholiaQ29039122MaRDI QIDQ1106746

Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 1988

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254541




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