Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value
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Publication:2248902
Recommendations
- Collusion properties of values
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- Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
- Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- Collusion properties of values
- Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
- Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
- Marginality, differential marginality, and the Banzhaf value
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
- Notes on a comment on 2-efficiency and the Banzhaf value
- On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom
- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
Cited in
(9)- Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- Collusion properties of coalition values for games in characteristic function form
- Decomposition of the space of TU-games, strong transfer invariance and the Banzhaf value
- Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
- Collusion properties of values
- Indices of collusion among judges and an anti-collusion average
- The blocker postulates for measures of voting power
- The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree
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