Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- New axiomatizations of values of TU-games using reduction properties
- Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
Cites work
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property
- Collusion properties of values
- Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- On fairness in the carpool problem
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games
- Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow
- Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
Cited in
(21)- The proportional Shapley value and applications
- The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
- Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
- Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values
- Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions
- Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- New axiomatizations of values of TU-games using reduction properties
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set
- Marginality and the position value
- Order preservation with dummies in the museum pass problem
- Modifications of several axiomatizations of the Shapley value by weakening the efficiency axiom
- On subgame consistency of the Shapley-Shubik power index
- Nullified-game consistency and axiomatizations of the core of TU-games with a fixed player set
This page was built for publication: Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q274053)
