Nullified equal loss property and equal division values

DOI10.1007/S11238-017-9604-1zbMATH Open1395.91019OpenAlexW2493102524MaRDI QIDQ1698971FDOQ1698971

Authors: Sylvain Ferrières 

Publication date: 16 February 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2016-06.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

equal divisionequal surplus divisioncommon-pool resourcebargaining under riskplayer nullification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
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• Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
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Cited In (14)

• Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
• On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
• Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
• The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
• Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
• Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
• New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions
• Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure
• Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
• Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
• Solidarity within a fixed community
• Sharing the surplus and proportional values
• A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games
• Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values

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