Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
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Publication:1698971
DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9604-1zbMath1395.91019OpenAlexW2493102524MaRDI QIDQ1698971
Publication date: 16 February 2018
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2016-06.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions ⋮ On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions ⋮ Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value ⋮ Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values ⋮ Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values ⋮ Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions ⋮ Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values ⋮ Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values ⋮ Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
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