Nullified equal loss property and equal division values
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
- Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Axioms of invariance for TU-games
- Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
- Modeling values for TU-games using generalized versions of consistency, standardness and the null player property
- Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
- Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: A case for proportional taxation
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Null players, solidarity, and the egalitarian Shapley values
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- Uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
- Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
Cited in
(14)- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions
- Effects of players' nullification and equal (surplus) division values
- The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value
- New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions
- Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure
- Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
- Players' nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games
- Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values
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