Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing

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Publication:2778971

DOI10.1287/mnsc.8.3.325zbMath0995.90578OpenAlexW2069876834MaRDI QIDQ2778971

Martin Shubik

Publication date: 22 October 2002

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d01/d0112.pdf




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