THE DUTTA-RAY SOLUTION ON THE CLASS OF CONVEX GAMES: A GENERALIZATION AND MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES
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Publication:5716142
DOI10.1142/S0219198905000624zbMath1151.91343OpenAlexW2047310588MaRDI QIDQ5716142
Bezalel Peleg, Jens Leth Hougaard, Lars Peter Østerdal
Publication date: 9 January 2006
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000624
Related Items (6)
Monotonicity of social welfare optima ⋮ Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games ⋮ Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin ⋮ Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games ⋮ Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theory
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- Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
- Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
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