Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2641231
DOI10.1007/BF01753707zbMath0721.90089MaRDI QIDQ2641231
Publication date: 1990
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
monotonicity; greedy algorithm; Shapley value; core; flow game; non-side-payment games; convex hyperplane game; super-additive side-payment games
Related Items
Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theory, CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES, THE DUTTA-RAY SOLUTION ON THE CLASS OF CONVEX GAMES: A GENERALIZATION AND MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES, Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value, Monotonicity of social welfare optima, Solution concept for generalized multistage games without side payments, On the existence of population-monotonic solutions on the domain of quasi-convex games, Strategic transfers between cooperative games, AN OVERVIEW ON GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS TO ENGINEERING
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Communication and its cost in graph-restricted games
- Convex games without side payments
- Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
- Cores of convex games
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Totally balanced games arising from controlled programming problems
- Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
- An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
- An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
- Values of Graph-Restricted Games
- Minimum cost spanning tree games
- Generalized Network Problems Yielding Totally Balanced Games
- Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- On the core of linear production games
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Activity selection games and the minimum‐cut problem
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game