CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
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Publication:5694438
DOI10.1142/S0219198905000417zbMath1134.91319MaRDI QIDQ5694438
Laurence Kranich, Andrés Perea, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 30 September 2005
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198905000417
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Cites Work
- The core of a monetary economy without trust
- Monotonicity of solutions in certain dynamic cooperative games
- A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economies
- The strong sequential core for two-period economies
- Credible coalitions and the core
- Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
- The Recursive Core
- Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience
- The Core of an N Person Game
