The Core of an N Person Game

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Publication:5574573

DOI10.2307/1909383zbMath0183.24003OpenAlexW2159241449MaRDI QIDQ5574573

Herbert E. Scarf

Publication date: 1967

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1909383




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