The Core of an N Person Game
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Publication:5574573
DOI10.2307/1909383zbMATH Open0183.24003OpenAlexW2159241449MaRDI QIDQ5574573FDOQ5574573
Authors: Herbert Scarf
Publication date: 1967
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1909383
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures
- Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- A note on kernels and Sperner's Lemma
- The epsilon core of a large replica game
- Core tâtonnement
- Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function
- Preference and utility. A constructive development
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Redistribution of longevity risk: the effect of heterogeneous mortality beliefs
- An EPQ model with inflation in an imperfect production system
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Perfect graphs are kernel solvable
- Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
- An equilibrium model with mixed federal structures
- Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining
- Market representations of $n$-person games
- An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
- The core of a cooperative game without side payments
- How to efficiently allocate houses under price controls?
- On the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz-Shapley theorem
- An extension of the KKMS theorem
- On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets
- A simple proof of K-K-M-S theorem
- An elementary proof of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz-Shapley theorem
- On Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the K-K-M-S theorem and the core of a balanced game
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Stochastic cooperative games in insurance
- The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
- A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games
- A theorem on open coverings of a simplex and Scarf's core existence theorem through Brouwer's fixed point theorem
- Cores of partitioning games
- Least concave utility functions
- A periodic-review inventory system with a capacitated backup supplier for mitigating supply disruptions
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Insurance with multiple insurers: a game-theoretic approach
- The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
- Properties of solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilities
- Moral hazard and stability
- Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
- A characterization of polyhedral market games
- A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
- The core of discontinuous games
- A note on the core
- The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
- Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm
- On cores and indivisibility
- Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- \(Interim\) core concepts for a Bayesian pure exchange economy
- Subordinated hedonic games
- Recent development in computational complexity characterization of Nash equilibrium
- Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments
- Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
- Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games
- Edgeworth equilibria in production economies
- Existence of fuzzy cores and generalizations of the K-K-M-S theorem
- CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
- Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
- Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences
- The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
- The central assignment game and the assignment markets
- On a lemma of Scarf.
- Mean-payoff games with \(\omega\)-regular specifications
- Convex games without side payments
- Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
- An existence theorem for a bargaining set
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Intersecting families of sets and the topology of cones in economics
- Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
- Totally balanced games arising from controlled programming problems
- How to divide a cake when people have different metabolism?
- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
- The equivalence of superadditivity and balancedness in the proportional tax game
- The existence of core allocations in a one sector model of capital accumulation
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- The core-partition of a hedonic game
- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
- Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies
- Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
- Indivisible commodities and the nonemptiness of the weak core
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- \(\mathsf{PPAD}\)-completeness of polyhedral versions of Sperner's lemma
- The core of an economy with differential information
- The \textit{ex ante} \(\alpha\)-core for normal form games with uncertainty
- On the nonemptiness of the \(\alpha\)-core of discontinuous games: transferable and nontransferable utilities
- Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores
- Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect
- The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players
- An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form
- Existence of the core in a heterogeneous divisible commodity exchange economy
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Optimal reinsurance with multiple reinsurers: competitive pricing and coalition stability
- On \(\varepsilon\)-cores of balanced games
- Some results on the weak core of a non-side-payment game with infinitely many players
- Cooperative games arising from network flow problems
- A stochastic bargaining process for \(n\)-person games
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