An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(85)90020-5zbMath0581.90102OpenAlexW1986823232MaRDI QIDQ1068733

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(85)90020-5

zbMATH Keywords

core axiomatization without side payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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