Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00025-6zbMath1028.91525OpenAlexW2066181047MaRDI QIDQ1300380

Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij

Publication date: 1 September 1999

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00025-6

zbMATH Keywords

consistencycoreWalrasian equilibriumreduced economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Group preferences (91B10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (21)

Max-consistency, complement-consistency and the core of fuzzy games ⋮ Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games ⋮ On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game ⋮ Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games ⋮ Axiomatizing core extensions ⋮ The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games ⋮ Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution ⋮ Fuzzy games: a characterization of the core ⋮ Cooperative Games ⋮ A note on the core: minimal conversely consistent enlargement ⋮ The precore: converse consistent enlargements and alternative axiomatic results ⋮ Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods ⋮ An axiomatization of the inner core using appropriate reduced games ⋮ Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core of multi-choice NTU games ⋮ The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games ⋮ Characterization of an extended Walrasian concept for open economies ⋮ Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare ⋮ Consistent extensions and subsolutions of the core for the multichoice transferable-utility games ⋮ MOULIN REDUCTION, V-N REDUCTION AND AXIOMATIZATIONS OF THE DUPLICATE CORE ⋮ The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach. ⋮ Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures

Cites Work

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• An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Stability and the Nash solution
• A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
• A necessary and sufficient condition for Walrasian social choice
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form
• Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production
• Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

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