Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
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Publication:1753415
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.11.051zbMath1402.91024OpenAlexW2559291192MaRDI QIDQ1753415
Peter Sudhölter, José Manuel Zarzuelo
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.11.051
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
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