A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
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Publication:256597
DOI10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7zbMath1358.91010OpenAlexW1130786658MaRDI QIDQ256597
M. Josune Albizuri, J. M. Echarri, José Manuel Zarzuelo
Publication date: 9 March 2016
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (3)
The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game ⋮ Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
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