A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems

DOI10.1007/S10479-015-1981-7zbMATH Open1358.91010OpenAlexW1130786658MaRDI QIDQ256597FDOQ256597

Authors M. J. Albizuri, J. M. Echarri, José M. Zarzuelo

Publication date 9 March 2016

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7

zbMATH Keywords

airport problemcooperative gamescost allocationNash programnoncooperative mechanismShapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
• Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.
• Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems
• Bargaining and Value
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Sharing costs in highways: a game theoretic approach
• Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
• Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
• Updating claims in bankruptcy problems

Cited in

(6)

• Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
• Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game
• Cost allocation and airport problems
• A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
• A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules
• The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility

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