A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems
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Publication:256597
DOI10.1007/S10479-015-1981-7zbMATH Open1358.91010OpenAlexW1130786658MaRDI QIDQ256597FDOQ256597
Authors: M. J. Albizuri, J. M. Echarri, José M. Zarzuelo 
Publication date: 9 March 2016
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1981-7
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Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cites Work
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
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- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems
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- A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
- Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus
- A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games
- Sharing costs in highways: a game theoretic approach
- Updating claims in bankruptcy problems
- Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Bargaining and Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
Cited In (6)
- Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods
- A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules
- Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game
- A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Cost allocation and airport problems
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