Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud

From MaRDI portal

Publication:1066823

Jump to:navigation, search

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90102-4zbMath0578.90100OpenAlexW1989936306WikidataQ56388115 ScholiaQ56388115MaRDI QIDQ1066823

Michael Maschler, Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90102-4

zbMATH Keywords

kernel nucleolus fair allocation bankruptcy problems Talmud divide an estate among creditors pre-kernel coalition proportional division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items

Bankruptcy problems with non-integer claims: definition and characterizations of the ICEA solution, A precedence constraint value revisited, Measuring and rewarding flexibility in collaborative distribution, including two-partner coalitions, On the reduced game property and its converse, Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods, Sequential bargaining with common values, Distributive justice in taxation, Bargaining under monotonicity constraints, On the core and bargaining set of a veto game, Finding the nucleolus of any \(n\)-person cooperative game by a single linear program, Dividing justly in bargaining problems with claims, Axiomatizations of symmetrically weighted solutions, The TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems, Protective properties and the constrained equal awards rule for claims problems: A note, Stability and the Nash solution, The proportional solution for rights problems, A new analysis of a simple model of fair allocation, Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations, On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems, A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing, Resource allocation games: a compromise stable extension of bankruptcy games, Stochastic bankruptcy games, Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks, New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule, For claims problems, compromising between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules, Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility, Non-proportional inequality preservation in gains and losses, One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable, A new approach for bounding awards in bankruptcy problems, Priority classes and weighted constrained equal awards rules for the claims problem, The two-stage constrained equal awards and losses rules for multi-issue allocation situations, Three ancient problems solved by using the game theory logic based on the Shapley value, Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules, Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses, A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, The equal-loss principle for bargaining problems, The pseudo-average rule: bankruptcy, cost allocation and bargaining, Bankruptcy and the per capita nucleolus: the claim-and-right rules family, Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources, Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin, An average lexicographic value for cooperative games, Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value, A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules, Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in \(G\)-hyperplane games, The monoclus of a coalitional game, Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems, For claims problems, another compromise between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules, A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems, Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims, The reverse self-dual serial cost-sharing rule, Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution, The minimal overlap rule: restrictions on mergers for creditors' consensus, Collective rationality and monotone path division rules, The minimal overlap rule revisited, Secured lower bound, composition up, and minimal rights first for bankruptcy problems, Allocation rules on networks, A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate, Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games, The least square nucleolus is a normalized Banzhaf value, A new axiomatization of the Shapley value, On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency, Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets, Implementing a public project and distributing its cost, Bargaining problems with claims, Clan games, A simple family of solutions for forest games, Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities, Remarks on the integer Talmud solution for integer bankruptcy problems, Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims, Some non-superadditive games, and their Shapley values, in the talmud, Flow sharing and bankruptcy games, Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic viewpoint, Michael Maschler's bibliography, A generalization of the Shapley-ichiishi result, Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods, The average-of-awards rule for claims problems, Core, least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games, The self-dual serial cost-sharing rule, Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems, A composite run-to-the-bank rule for multi-issue allocation situations, Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games, Cooperation under interval uncertainty, Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments, A characterization of the nucleolus for convex games, The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games, On the concavity of delivery games, Consistency and its converse: an introduction, Rationing a commodity along fixed paths, Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games, Scale invariance and similar invariance conditions for bankruptcy problems, Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims, Convex games with an infinite number of players and sequencing situations, Liberal political equality implies proportional representation, Convex interval games, Distributive and additive costsharing of an homogeneous good, Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution, An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments, The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach, A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems, Parametric rationing methods, Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims, Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson, Taxation and poverty, The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic, On surplus-sharing in partnerships, BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION, A Problem of Distributive Justice, Solved by the Lasso, Rationing problems with ex-ante conditions, How to divide a cake when people have different metabolism?, Updating claims in bankruptcy problems, On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values, Mixed rules in multi‐issue allocation situations, The reverse TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems, On the convexity of independent set games, A random arrival rule for division problems with multiple references, Wary of the worst: maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive, A double-weighted bankruptcy method to allocate \(\mathrm{CO}_2\) emissions permits, Cost Sharing in a Condo Under Law’s Umbrella, A bankruptcy problem and an information trading problem: Applications tok-convex games, On the complexity of nucleolus computation for bipartite \(b\)-matching games, Duality in land rental problems, Sequential claim games, Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency, Refining the Lorenz‐ranking of rules for claims problems on restricted domains, Rationing rules for risky claims, Strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems, ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION", Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud, Resource allocation problems with concave reward functions, Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims, Divide and choose: an informationally robust strategic approach to bankruptcy problems, Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences, Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law, Cost Allocation in Common Facilities Sharing, Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims, Arboricity games: the core and the nucleolus, Additive adjudication of conflicting claims, Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences, On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws, A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims, Rationing rules and stable coalition structures, Rationing with baselines: the composition extension operator, Computation of the random arrival rule for bankruptcy problems, Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, Rationing in the presence of baselines, Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities, On the convergence of the random arrival rule in large claims problems, CONVEXITY OF THE "AIRPORT PROFIT GAME" AND k-CONVEXITY OF THE "BANKRUPTCY GAME", Cost Sharing in Production Economies, A rule for slack allocation proportional to the duration in a PERT network, On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach, Finding nucleolus of flow game, The equal award principle in problems with constraints and claims, HOW TO HANDLE INTERVAL SOLUTIONS FOR COOPERATIVE INTERVAL GAMES, The Shapley value of cooperative games under fuzzy settings: a survey, Unnamed Item, How the Talmud Divides an Estate Among Creditors, Axiomatic characterizations of the CEA solution for rationing problems, Additive rules in discrete allocation problems, THE CORE AND CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES: A GENERAL CHARACTERISATION, Probabilistic choice in games: properties of Rosenthal's \(t\)-solutions, Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity, Allocation problems among sharing groups, Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy, Bargaining property of nucleolus and \(\tau\)-value in a class of TU-games, Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson, The constrained equal loss rule in problems with constraints and claims, Knowledge, Games and Tales from the East, Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach, SHARE OPPORTUNITY SETS AND COOPERATIVE GAMES, A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem, Equilibrium recoveries in insurance markets with limited liability, A competitive solution for cooperative truckload delivery, On a cooperative game in the knapsack problem, Money or morality: fairness ideals in unstructured bargaining, Computing the nucleolus of weighted cooperative matching games in polynomial time, PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS, Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games, An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave, The Complexity of the Nucleolus in Compact Games, Game-Theoretic Learning and Allocations in Robust Dynamic Coalitional Games, A characterization of the random arrival rule for bankruptcy problems, GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY AND TAXATION PROBLEMS: RECENT ADVANCES, Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations, Constrained stochastic cost allocation, Legal Disputes Resolved via Game Theoretic Methods, Cooperative games: historical problems, modern theory, Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment, Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update, A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems, Cost-efficient equitable water distribution in Algeria: a bicriteria fair division problem with network constraints, From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach, Rationing Rules Under Uncertain Claims: A Survey, \(k\)-core covers and the core, THE NUCLEOLUS OF THE BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM BY HYDRAULIC RATIONING, A near equitable 2-person cake cutting algorithm, Systematic favorability in claims problems with indivisibilities, Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by exemption and exclusion properties, On Analyzing Cost Allocation Problems: Cooperation Building Structures and Order Problem Representations, Efficient extensions of the Myerson value based on endogenous claims from players, On the resolution of cross-liabilities, Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach, Financial and operational creditors in bankruptcy resolution: a general equilibrium approach under three game-theoretic division rules with an application to India, Allocating \(\mathrm{CO}_2\) emissions: a dynamic claims problem, New results for multi-issue allocation problems and their solutions, Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems, Generalizing the constrained equal awards rule, On fair compensation, Sharing sequential values in a network, Characterizing convexity of games using marginal vectors, A group bargaining solution, An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' rule, (Pre)kernel catchers for cooperative games, Strategic bargaining, surplus sharing problems and the nucleolus, Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder), Sharing the cost of risky projects, A bankruptcy approach to solve the fixed cost allocation problem in transport systems, Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems, On the core of routing games, Fair division with uncertain needs, On solving mutual liability problems, From the bankruptcy problem and its concede-and-divide solution to the assignment problem and its fair division solution, A tale of two bargaining solutions, Psychology of game playing: introduction to a special issue, Inequality minimising subsidy and taxation, Strategy-proof allotment rules, A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules, Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games, Tree enterprises and bankruptcy ventures. A game theoretic similarity due to a graph theoretic proof, A new characterization of the proportional rule for claims problems, Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences, The nucleolus is contested-garment-consistent: A direct proof, Consistent bilateral assignment, Inequality preserving rationing, The reverse Talmud family of rules for bankruptcy problems: a characterization, On systems of quotas from bankruptcy perspective: the sampling estimation of the random arrival rule, On the 1-nucleolus, Generalized additive games, An algorithm for the min-max loss rule for claims problems, The two-agent claims-truncated proportional rule has no consistent extension: a constructive proof, A bankruptcy approach to the core cover, Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey., Nonsymmetric variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolus, Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results, A consistent talmudic rule for division problems with multiple references, Characterization sets for the nucleolus in balanced games, Collaborative shipping under different cost-sharing agreements, Quantum prisoner dilemma under decoherence, Loss sharing: characterizing a new class of rules, Filling a multicolor urn: An axiomatic analysis., How to be fairer, Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems., Sustainability, exemption, and the constrained equal awards rule: a note., How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects, Cartels via the modiclus., Decentralization and mutual liability rules, NTU-bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle, The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards., Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games, Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value, Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs, Enjoying cooperative games: the \textbf{R} package \textbf{GameTheory}, Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective, Proportional rules for state contingent claims, Sustainable allocation of greenhouse gas emission permits for firms with Leontief technologies, Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy, Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility, Families of sequential priority rules and random arrival rules with withdrawal limits, Multi-commodity rationing problems with maxmin payoffs, Self-interest and equity concerns: a behavioural allocation rule for operational problems, Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value, Claim games for estate division problems, Liability games, A proportional approach to claims problems with a guaranteed minimum, On the bankruptcy situations and the Alexia value, Multi-issue allocation situations, Minimal rights based solidarity, On the adjudication of conflicting claims: an experimental study, A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds, Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims, On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games, A noncooperative foundation of the competitive divisions for bads, The nucleolus of arborescence games in directed acyclic graphs, Sequential bankruptcy problems, Considerations on the aggregate monotonicity of the nucleolus and the core-center, Compromise values in cooperative game theory, The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games, Mixing solutions for claims problems, Tensor approximation of cooperative games and their semivalues, The general graph matching game: approximate core, A random arrival rule for NTU-bankruptcy problems, Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs, Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games in pseudo-polynomial time, Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels, `Hydraulic' rationing, Multi-issue bankruptcy problems with crossed claims, Some game theoretic marketing attribution models, The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations, Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects, From jungle to civilized economy: the power foundation of exchange economy equilibrium, A new approach to agglomeration problems, Reduced two-bound core games, Equalizing solutions for bankruptcy problems revisited, The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems., The proportional rule for problems with constraints and claims., Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims, Sustainability in bankruptcy problems.

Cites Work

Retrieved from "https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/w/index.php?title=Publication:1066823&oldid=13084291"