Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
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Publication:1066823
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90102-4zbMath0578.90100WikidataQ56388115 ScholiaQ56388115MaRDI QIDQ1066823
Robert John Aumann, Michael Maschler
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90102-4
kernel; nucleolus; fair allocation; bankruptcy problems; Talmud; divide an estate among creditors; pre-kernel coalition; proportional division
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