PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS

DOI10.1142/S0219198906000825zbMath1138.91512OpenAlexW1985089376MaRDI QIDQ5470119

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

Publication date: 29 May 2006

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000825

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic characterizationsbankruptcy problemsmanipulation via merging or splittingproportional allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

A sequential partition method for non-cooperative games of bankruptcy problems ⋮ Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split ⋮ Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems ⋮ Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach ⋮ A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate ⋮ Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy ⋮ A NOTE ON PASSEPARTOUT PROBLEMS ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

Cites Work

• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• The proportional solution for rights problems
• A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
• The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule
• Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
• The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
• New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules

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