PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS
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Publication:5470119
DOI10.1142/S0219198906000825zbMath1138.91512MaRDI QIDQ5470119
Publication date: 29 May 2006
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000825
axiomatic characterizations; bankruptcy problems; manipulation via merging or splitting; proportional allocation
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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Cites Work
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- The proportional solution for rights problems
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
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- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule
- Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
- The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
- New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules