Probabilistic choice in games: properties of Rosenthal's \(t\)-solutions
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Publication:2491083
DOI10.1007/s00182-005-0003-4zbMath1151.91385OpenAlexW2120764498MaRDI QIDQ2491083
Publication date: 26 May 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0003-4
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