Fast convergence in evolutionary models: a Lyapunov approach

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.10.008MaRDI QIDQ899674zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Lorens A. Imhof

Publication date 30 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chainhitting timeLyapunov functionlocal interactionlearning modelrecency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited in

(5)

• The evolution of fast reaction: a reaction-diffusion model
• A class of fast-slow models for adaptive resistance evolution
• Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection
• Optimal convergence in fame game with familiarity
• Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information

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