Fast convergence in evolutionary models: a Lyapunov approach

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.10.008zbMATH Open1369.91021OpenAlexW1951698583MaRDI QIDQ899674FDOQ899674

Drew Fudenberg, Lorens A. Imhof, Glenn Ellison

Publication date: 30 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.008

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zbMATH Keywords

Markov chainhitting timeLyapunov functionlocal interactionlearning modelrecency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited In (3)

• The evolution of fast reaction: a reaction-diffusion model
• A class of fast-slow models for adaptive resistance evolution
• Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information

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