Learning in games with unstable equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2271377
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.09.003zbMath1175.91031OpenAlexW2237993507MaRDI QIDQ2271377
Michel Benaïm, Ed Hopkins, Josef Hofbauer
Publication date: 7 August 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/en/publications/5d60b66e-f88b-42f1-b42e-407b951a1692
Related Items
Non-algebraic convergence proofs for continuous-time fictitious play, Distributed dynamic reinforcement of efficient outcomes in multiagent coordination and network formation, An evolutionary analysis of Varian's model of sales, Cycle frequency in standard rock-paper-scissors games: evidence from experimental economics, Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria, Stability of switched systems with multiple equilibria: a mixed stable-unstable subsystem case, Fast convergence in evolutionary models: a Lyapunov approach, Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium, The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria, Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with logit dynamics, Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable?, Evolutionary Game Theory, Instability of belief-free equilibria, Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium, Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners, Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games, Does moral play equilibrate?, Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in \(2\times 2\) games, Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
- An experimental study of price dispersion
- Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
- Learning, matching, and aggregation
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium.
- Buyer search and price dispersion: a laboratory study.
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- A note on best response dynamics.
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
- Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
- Learning purified mixed equilibria
- Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
- The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Equilibrium Price Dispersion
- Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in Experimental Markets
- Chain recurrence and discretisation
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Stochastic Approximations and Differential Inclusions
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
