Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples

DOI10.1007/S13235-013-0096-5MaRDI QIDQ2348567zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 15 June 2015

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4nx5s4h8

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsperfect Bayesian equilibriumstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Cites work

• COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: LEARNING OF STRATEGIES AND EVOLUTION OF PREFERENCES IN PRISONERS' DILEMMA AND HAWK-DOVE GAMES
• Equilibrium vengeance
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• Evolution of Preferences1
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• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Gradient dynamics in population games: some basic results
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• Learning in games with unstable equilibria
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• On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario
• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
• Revisiting strategic models of evolution: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies
• Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space

Cited in

(5)

• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
• A new evolutionary game analysis for industrial pollution management considering the central Government's punishment
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• On the evolution of continuous types under replicator and gradient dynamics: two examples
• On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario

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