On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario

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Publication:5938045


DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2668zbMath0991.91051OpenAlexW2052893296MaRDI QIDQ5938045

Fernando Vega-Redondo, Efe A. Ok

Publication date: 18 July 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2668



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