Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments

DOI10.1080/00222500902747360zbMath1275.91021OpenAlexW2013036071MaRDI QIDQ3650939

Pier Luigi Sacco, Domenico Menicucci

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00222500902747360

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicscooperationevolution of preferencescoordinationsocially sensitive preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency ⋮ A positional game for an overlapping generation economy

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