Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments
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Publication:3650939
DOI10.1080/00222500902747360zbMath1275.91021MaRDI QIDQ3650939
Pier Luigi Sacco, Domenico Menicucci
Publication date: 7 December 2009
Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00222500902747360
replicator dynamics; cooperation; evolution of preferences; coordination; socially sensitive preferences
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