Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-IzbMath0767.90095OpenAlexW1984093548MaRDI QIDQ1201139

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-i

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stability finite automata meta-players repeated stage game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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