On the level of cooperative behavior in a local-interaction model.

DOI10.1007/BF01227494zbMath1051.91010OpenAlexW1562013172MaRDI QIDQ1612740

Harold Houba, Alexander F. Tieman, Gerard van der Laan

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01227494

zbMATH Keywords

Markov processesevolutioncooperationlocal interactionprisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame.

Cites Work

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• Evolution, learning, and economic behavior
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• Evolving aspirations and cooperation
• Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart
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• The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals
• Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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