Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2255zbMath0887.90191OpenAlexW3123480790MaRDI QIDQ1367892

Larry Samuelson, Kenneth G. Binmore

Publication date: 6 May 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4426.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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