A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games

From MaRDI portal
Publication:5963299

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010zbMath1369.91039OpenAlexW3020884208MaRDI QIDQ5963299

Michael Mäs, Heinrich H. Nax

Publication date: 7 March 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010




Related Items

Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetryEvolutionary game theory: a renaissanceContribution-based grouping under noisePerturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove gameThe evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakesCompeting conventions with costly information acquisitionDeep and shallow thinking in the long runDiscontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the labTransitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choiceStochastic stability in assignment problemsEvolution and the ultimatum gameEvolution and Rawlsian social choice in matchingConvergence of linear threshold decision-making dynamics in finite heterogeneous populationsFraming and repeated competitionComparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophicationStochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problemsAn experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamicsPositive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice ruleProspect dynamics and loss dominanceRisk attitudes and risk dominance in the long runSocial coordination with locally observable typesMetastability in stochastic replicator dynamicsCompromise and coordination: an experimental studyRational altruism? On preference estimation and dictator game experimentsReference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stabilityGames with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous timeA stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form gamesImitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selectionLearning efficient equilibria in repeated gamesMemory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk-dove gameEquilibrium analysis and incentive-based control of the anticoordinating networked game dynamicsTributes to Bill SandholmThe lower convergence tendency of imitators compared to best responders



Cites Work


This page was built for publication: A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games