A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games
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Publication:5963299
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010zbMath1369.91039OpenAlexW3020884208MaRDI QIDQ5963299
Publication date: 7 March 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010
learningstochastic stabilityevolutionbehavioral game theorydiscrete choicelogit responsetrial-and-error
Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)
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