Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
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Abstract: We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, which satisfies the marginal bandwagon property (i.e., there is positive feedback to coordinate). Our main result is that the most likely evolutionary escape paths from a status quo convention consist of a series of identical mistakes. As an application of our result, we show that the Nash bargaining solution arises as the long run convention for the evolutionary Nash demand game under the usual logit choice rule. We also obtain a new bargaining solution if the logit choice rule is combined with intentional idiosyncratic plays. The new bargaining solution is more egalitarian than the Nash bargaining solution, demonstrating that intentionality implies equality under the logit choice model.
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Cited in
(6)- Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
- Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
- Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining
- Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
- Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice
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