A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
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Publication:1421890
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00069-3zbMATH Open1158.91307MaRDI QIDQ1421890FDOQ1421890
Authors: David P. Myatt, Chris C. Wallace 
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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Cited In (23)
- Sample path large deviations for stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Stochastic stability in assignment problems
- Hamilton-Jacobi equations with semilinear costs and state constraints, with applications to large deviations in games
- Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks
- Stochastic dynamics and Edmonds' algorithm
- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
- Potential games in volatile environments
- Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice
- Robust stochastic stability
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
- Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
- Evolutionary game theory
- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- On the relationship between \(p\)-dominance and stochastic stability in network games
- Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice
- The logit-response dynamics
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