A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00069-3zbMath1158.91307MaRDI QIDQ1421890

David P. Myatt, Chris C. Wallace

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Dominated strategies; Idiosyncrasy; Multinomial probit; Stochastic evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A05: 2-person games

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Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games, Potential games in volatile environments, Large deviations and multinomial probit choice, Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies, A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems, Stochastic stability in assignment problems, Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability, Robust stochastic stability, The logit-response dynamics, Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature, Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks

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