A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
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Publication:894006
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.015zbMath1330.91151OpenAlexW2156576743MaRDI QIDQ894006
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/9223
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Cites Work
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