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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(22)- The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
- An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games
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- ``Greedy demand adjustment in cooperative games
- Stability of an allocation of objects
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