Stochastic stability in assignment problems

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.11.002zbMATH Open1368.91160OpenAlexW3023961125MaRDI QIDQ899503FDOQ899503

Jonathan Newton, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econ-wpseries.com/2014/201405.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemstochastic stabilitydecentralization(core) stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• Recontracting Stability
• Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Stochastic stability for roommate markets
• Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
• Coalitional stochastic stability
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
• A property of the core
• Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games
• Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
• On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
• Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
• Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
• Paths to stability in the assignment problem
• Stochastic stability on general state spaces

Cited In (20)

• The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
• An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games
• The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
• ``Greedy demand adjustment in cooperative games
• Stability of an allocation of objects
• Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry
• Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
• Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
• Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
• Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture
• Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
• Robustly assigning unstable items
• Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
• Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems
• Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games
• The evolution of exchange.
• A Stochastic Analysis of a Staffing Problem
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Trader matching and the selection of market institutions

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