Coalitional stochastic stability

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.014zbMath1239.91009OpenAlexW2015727761MaRDI QIDQ423759

Jonathan Newton

Publication date: 4 June 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.014

zbMATH Keywords

learningstochastic stabilitycoalitioncontractlexicographic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites Work

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• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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