The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1735801
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.005zbMath1419.91097OpenAlexW2909071460MaRDI QIDQ1735801
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.005
Related Items
The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game, Deep and shallow thinking in the long run, Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture, Agency, potential and contagion
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
- Evolving cooperation
- Coalitional stochastic stability
- Some interesting properties of maximin strategies
- Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: an experimental study
- Evolution and Kantian morality
- Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution
- Names for games: locating \(2 \times 2\) games
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists
- Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration
- Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games
- Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
- The preferences of homo moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
- The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory
- Direct reciprocity in structured populations
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching