Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists

DOI10.3390/g8030038zbMath1410.91057OpenAlexW2754201343WikidataQ115783313 ScholiaQ115783313MaRDI QIDQ1656969

Ingela Alger, Joergen W. Weibull

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030038

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesrepeated gamesmoralityaltruismhomo moralis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Editorial: Ethics, morality, and game theory, Screening teams of moral and altruistic agents, Universalization and altruism, The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types

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