Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria

DOI10.3982/ECTA11048MaRDI QIDQ4614280zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roger B. Myerson, Jörgen W. Weibull

Publication date 30 January 2019

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11048

zbMATH Keywords

normconventionconsideration setsettled equilibriumtenable block

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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