Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0277-8zbMath1051.91001OpenAlexW2145534034WikidataQ59900208 ScholiaQ59900208MaRDI QIDQ1407768

Federico Echenique

Publication date: 21 September 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0277-8

zbMATH Keywords

LearningSupermodular gamesStrategic complementaritiesMixed strategy equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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