Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes
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Cites work
- A characterization of strategic complementarities.
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
- Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
- Games with strategic complements and substitutes
- Introduction to computer science and economic theory
- Microeconomic theory
- Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements
- Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
- Social and economic networks.
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
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