Embedding games with strategic complements into games with strategic substitutes
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Publication:1800967
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.005zbMath1416.91017OpenAlexW2887976922MaRDI QIDQ1800967
Zhigang Cao, Changjun Wang, Xiao-guang Yang, Cheng-Zhong Qin, Xu-jin Chen
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.07.005
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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Cites Work
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