The assignment game. I: The core

DOI10.1007/BF01753437MaRDI QIDQ2552452zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Lloyd S. Shapley, Martin Shubik

Publication date 1971

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01753437

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities
• A generalized assignment game
• A survey on assignment markets
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games

Cites work

• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138564 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139335 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3177183 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3006370 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3185418 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Indivisibilites dans une Economie d'Echanges
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences

Cited in

(only showing first 100 items - show all)

• The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
• Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games
• Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs
• Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
• Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games
• Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents
• A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
• Modeling cooperation on a class of distribution problems
• A pairwise-monotonic core selection for permutation games
• Sequential auctions on Boehm-Bawerk's horse market
• Random competitive exchange: Price distributions and gains from trade
• Rationing, bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets
• The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• Communication and its cost in graph-restricted games
• Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Bargaining in cooperative games
• Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• Cores of partitioning games
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• Cooperative games arising from network flow problems
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for balancedness in partitioning games
• The core of some location games
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Coalition formation under limited communication
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• The core of an m-sided assignment game
• Auctioning Böhm-Bawerk's horses
• Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies
• The \({\mathcal B}\)-nucleolus of TU-games
• Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities
• The supplier-firm-buyer game and its m-sided generalization
• Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs
• The core of a further m-sided assignment game
• Buying several indivisible goods
• Assignment models and reneging
• Combinatoric classes of the transportation problem and their properties
• Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
• The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem
• An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
• The nonatomic assignment model
• Inessentiality of large groups and the approximate core property: An equivalence theorem
• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• On Vickrey-type auction procedures
• The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games
• On the core of routing games
• Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
• Restricted housewapping games
• On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
• The law of supply in games, markets and matching models
• Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
• Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
• Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing.
• The pairwise egalitarian solution.
• Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
• A discrete fixed point theorem and its applications.
• Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
• Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities.
• A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
• Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
• Inventory games.
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
• Application of M-convex submodular flow problem to mathematical economics
• An alternative proof of an equilibrium existence theorem in exchange economies with indivisibilities
• Equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple indivisible commodities and money
• Characterization of the Owen set of linear production processes
• Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies
• A simple selling and buying procedure
• Equilibrium and matching under price controls
• On the stability of couples
• Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
• Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
• Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
• From the bankruptcy problem and its concede-and-divide solution to the assignment problem and its fair division solution
• The stable fixtures problem with payments
• Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
• Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
• On a class of vertices of the core
• Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching
• Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• The complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games
• Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings
• A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls
• Competition in a posted-salary matching market under private information
• On the 1-nucleolus
• The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
• The search value of a set
• Power at general equilibrium
• Pairwise mergers in bipartite matching games with an application in collaborative logistics
• An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game

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