A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
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Publication:1421883
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1zbMATH Open1175.91119OpenAlexW1979236205MaRDI QIDQ1421883FDOQ1421883
Authors: Hiroyuki Adachi 
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00085-1
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Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
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- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Assortative Matching and Search
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- Marriage and Class
- The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
Cited In (17)
- Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods
- Comparative Static and Computational Methods for an Empirical One-to-one Transferable Utility Matching Model
- Targeted search in matching markets
- Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
- Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
- Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models
- Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
- A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs
- Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
- Dynamically stable matching
- Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions
- Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare
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