A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1MaRDI QIDQ1421883zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hiroyuki Adachi

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00085-1

zbMATH Keywords

SearchGale-Shapley marriage problemStable matchingTwo-sided matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• Assortative Matching and Search
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Marriage and Class
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The job search problem as an employer–candidate game

Cited in

(17)

• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
• Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models
• A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time
• Comparative Static and Computational Methods for an Empirical One-to-one Transferable Utility Matching Model
• Targeted search in matching markets
• Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare
• Stable marriages and search frictions
• Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
• Dynamically stable matching
• Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs
• Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
• A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
• Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions
• Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
• Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods

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