A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00085-1zbMath1175.91119OpenAlexW1979236205MaRDI QIDQ1421883

Hiroyuki Adachi

Publication date: 3 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00085-1

zbMATH Keywords

SearchGale-Shapley marriage problemStable matchingTwo-sided matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Stable marriages and search frictions ⋮ Dynamically stable matching ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ A Large Population Partnership Formation Game with Associative Preferences and Continuous Time ⋮ Existence of steady-state equilibria in matching models with search frictions ⋮ Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods ⋮ Targeted search in matching markets ⋮ Decentralized matching: the role of commitment ⋮ Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• The assignment game. I: The core
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• Marriage and Class
• Assortative Matching and Search
• The job search problem as an employer–candidate game
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.