Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2830748
DOI10.1287/OPRE.2016.1509zbMATH Open1348.91117OpenAlexW2372440949MaRDI QIDQ2830748FDOQ2830748
Authors: Saeed Alaei, K. C. Jain, Azarakhsh Malekian
Publication date: 31 October 2016
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1509
Recommendations
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 16101
- Two-sided matching with externalities: a survey
- Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
- Competitive equilibria in matching models with financial constraints
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- The Core of an N Person Game
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
- A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
- Equilibrium in a discrete exchange economy with money
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
- The core of the matching game
Cited In (26)
- Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
- A matching method for second-hand goods exchange considering loss aversion of buyer and seller in e-brokerage
- On competitiveness in uniform utility allocation markets
- Preface to the special issue on information and decisions in social and economic networks
- Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents
- Optimal price/advertising menus for two-sided media platforms
- Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies
- Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division
- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
- Competitive equilibria for non-quasilinear bidders in combinatorial auctions
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
- Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility
- Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets
- Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
- A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
This page was built for publication: Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2830748)