The core of the matching game

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90017-OzbMath0754.90072MaRDI QIDQ1196648

David Gale, Ahmet U. Alkan

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

core; matching game; strong connectedness property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems, Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects, Groups, collective decisions and markets, Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences, Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences, Axiomatization of the core of assignment games, Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule, Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities, Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments, On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions., Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties, Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach, Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value, Households, markets and public choice, Household formation and markets, Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem, Competitive Equilibria in Two-Sided Matching Markets with General Utility Functions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The Core of an N Person Game