Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
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Publication:788605
DOI10.1007/BF01769864zbMath0531.90012OpenAlexW3124026818MaRDI QIDQ788605
Publication date: 1984
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769864
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