Groups, collective decisions and markets

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.004zbMath1244.91032MaRDI QIDQ629334

Hans Gersbach, Hans H. Haller

Publication date: 9 March 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibrium; household behavior; collective decision making; household formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B10: Group preferences

Related Items

Power at general equilibrium, The roommate problem with externalities, Households, markets and public choice, Household formation and markets

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