Groups, collective decisions and markets
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Publication:629334
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.10.004zbMATH Open1244.91032OpenAlexW2008689585MaRDI QIDQ629334FDOQ629334
Authors: Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller
Publication date: 9 March 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.004
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Cites Work
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Cited In (12)
- Households, markets and public choice
- On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy
- The roommate problem with externalities
- Household formation and markets
- Power at general equilibrium
- Club theory and household formation
- When inefficiency begets efficiency
- Collective decisions and competitive markets
- The Organization of Production, Consumption and Learning
- The affectionate society: Does competition for partners promote friendliness?
- Groups and markets. General equilibrium with multi-member households
- Does group discussion lead to better informed and more strategic market entry decisions?
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