Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2221zbMath0883.90030MaRDI QIDQ1363370

Robert P. Gilles, Suzanne Scotchmer

Publication date: 7 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/22k559dk

zbMATH Keywords

Lindahl equilibrium; exhaustion of blocking opportunities; replicated club economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B18: Public goods

91B50: General equilibrium theory

Related Items

Stable Matching in Large Economies, Clubs and the market: Large finite economies, Two characterizations of cost share equilibria, Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition, Club theory and household formation, Bargaining cum voice, Groups, collective decisions and markets, Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes, Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy, Power at general equilibrium, On efficient firm formation, Household formation and markets, Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods, Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs, OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
• A Tiebout theorem
• Public goods, growth, and welfare
• Equilibria, the core and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good: A correction
• Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
• Valuation equilibrium with clubs
• The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics
• Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
• Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types
• The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
• Externality pricing in club economies
• Tastes, Skills, and Local Public Goods
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy