Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
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Publication:1363370
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- A Tiebout theorem
- Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
- Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
- Equilibria, the core and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good: A correction
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types
- Externality pricing in club economies
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- Public goods, growth, and welfare
- Tastes, Skills, and Local Public Goods
- The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
- The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics
- Valuation equilibrium with clubs
Cited in
(15)- Power at general equilibrium
- Groups, collective decisions and markets
- Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
- Bargaining cum voice
- Clubs and the market: Large finite economies
- On efficient firm formation
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- Club theory and household formation
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
- Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
- Household formation and markets
- Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
- Two characterizations of cost share equilibria
- Stable matching in large economies
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