Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
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Publication:1363370
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2221zbMath0883.90030OpenAlexW2138454030MaRDI QIDQ1363370
Robert P. Gilles, Suzanne Scotchmer
Publication date: 7 August 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/22k559dk
Related Items
Club theory and household formation ⋮ Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Groups, collective decisions and markets ⋮ Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition ⋮ Power at general equilibrium ⋮ On efficient firm formation ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods ⋮ Clubs and the market: Large finite economies ⋮ OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS ⋮ Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy ⋮ Stable Matching in Large Economies ⋮ Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs ⋮ Household formation and markets
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