Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
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Publication:1363370
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2221zbMATH Open0883.90030OpenAlexW2138454030MaRDI QIDQ1363370FDOQ1363370
Robert P. Gilles, Suzanne Scotchmer
Publication date: 7 August 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/22k559dk
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Cites Work
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- Valuation equilibrium with clubs
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- Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
- The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- Tastes, Skills, and Local Public Goods
- A Tiebout theorem
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
- Public goods, growth, and welfare
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- Equilibria, the core and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good: A correction
- Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types
- The core and the hedonic core: Equivalence and comparative statics
- Externality pricing in club economies
Cited In (15)
- Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
- Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
- Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Household formation and markets
- Power at general equilibrium
- Clubs and the market: Large finite economies
- Club theory and household formation
- Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
- Stable Matching in Large Economies
- Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
- Bargaining cum voice
- Two characterizations of cost share equilibria
- Groups, collective decisions and markets
- On efficient firm formation
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