Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods

DOI10.2307/1885661zbMATH Open0437.90021OpenAlexW2127078558MaRDI QIDQ3879007FDOQ3879007

Publication date: 1980

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1885661

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survey efficiency Pareto optimality decentralization valuation functions core states decentralizability results public goods theory voluntary financing schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Public goods (91B18)

Cited In (42)

Coalitional economies with public projects
The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour
Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
Efficiency and nonlinear pricing in nonconvex environments with externalities: A generalization of the Lindahl equilibrium concept
Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
Core equivalence with congested public goods
Share equilibrium in local public good economies
Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
Profit-maximizing communities and the theory of local public expenditures: Comment
Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
The core coincides with the nucleolus allocations in a public goods economy with taxation
The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
Club theory and household formation
Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods
Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
Efficient egalitarian-equivalence and the core of an economy with public projects
Two characterizations of cost share equilibria
Static and dynamic (in)efficiency in public goods provision
Gale-Nikaido-Debreu and Milgrom-Shannon: communal interactions with endogenous community structures
Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition *
Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities
On the theory of cost sharing
Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
Market games and clubs

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