Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
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Publication:3879007
DOI10.2307/1885661zbMath0437.90021MaRDI QIDQ3879007
Publication date: 1980
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1885661
survey; efficiency; Pareto optimality; decentralization; valuation functions; core states; decentralizability results; public goods theory; voluntary financing schemes
91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
91B18: Public goods
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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