Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
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Publication:3879007
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Cited in
(42)- Market games and clubs
- The core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour
- Coalitional economies with public projects
- Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs
- Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods
- The equivalence of core and cost share equilibria in an economy with a public good
- Efficiency and nonlinear pricing in nonconvex environments with externalities: A generalization of the Lindahl equilibrium concept
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Core equivalence with congested public goods
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Share equilibrium in local public good economies
- Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
- Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
- Profit-maximizing communities and the theory of local public expenditures: Comment
- The core coincides with the nucleolus allocations in a public goods economy with taxation
- Club theory and household formation
- Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
- Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
- Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition
- Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods
- Efficient egalitarian-equivalence and the core of an economy with public projects
- Gale-Nikaido-Debreu and Milgrom-Shannon: communal interactions with endogenous community structures
- Static and dynamic (in)efficiency in public goods provision
- Two characterizations of cost share equilibria
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
- ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
- Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition *
- Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
- The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
- On the theory of cost sharing
- Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment
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